The scheme to damage hardware or data when Prolok Plus thinks someone's using a pirated copy seems ludicrous. Who wants to deal with the liability when this goes wrong due to a bug or unexpected circumstances?
pseudohadamard 68 days ago [-]
I remember it being referred to in the press as Killer Prolok at the time but can't find any references from a quick Google, presumably because it was all on dead trees rather than online. I'd never heard the Prolok Plus name until now.
tgsovlerkhgsel 69 days ago [-]
"Bright" ideas were and always will be a thing in copy protection mechanisms.
A similar, even higher profile case that shook the electronics industry around a decade ago was chip manufacturer FTDI releasing an update to their drivers that would detect and semi-permanently brick clones of FTDI USB serial bridge chips [1]. The bricking was performed by setting the USB product ID to zero, preventing Windows and macOS from detecting the device at all; the Linux drivers quickly got updated to recognize the new PID, allowing for the development of unbricking tools. Somewhat ironically, the detection relied on errata of the original parts that the clones fixed [2].
The backlash to this measure was massive, as many legitimate products turned out to use counterfeit FTDI parts without the manufacturers' awareness due to unreliable supply chains. Microsoft quickly pulled the update but FTDI seemed not to care for the most part, eventually releasing another similar update a couple of years later that would deliberately corrupt all data sent through clone chips.
Central Point Software, the makers of Copy II PC, was one of our customers (we created back office software, order processing etc.).
It was a pretty healthy business, not just for the copy protection breaking but also the general tools software.
Funny story:
I was at their offices working on a project when they were getting ready to ship out the new version. Their warehouse was connected to the office building and they were producing all of the final copies and loading them on trucks to get sent to the distributors.
In the morning they gave the all clear for the first wave of trucks to leave, then about 4 hours later someone found a bug and they had to call all of the trucks back to the warehouse, unload, re-create new clean product etc.
They did this about 3 times before that version finally made it to the distributors.
burnt-resistor 69 days ago [-]
Maybe my reading comprehension can't grok it, but it appears defeat-able by MFM reading and recreation like almost every other form of "special disk" modification. Kyroflux, greaseweazle, Copy II PC Option Board, etc.
stefanfisk 69 days ago [-]
My understanding is that it worked by doing read/write on a known bad sector to verify that the physical defect is there. Replicating that on normal discs sounds hard.
bombcar 69 days ago [-]
The problem with all these protection schemes is somewhere in the code they could usually be bypassed by turning a JNE to an unconditional jump.
So you had to add code to detect modifications which itself could be bypassed.
burnt-resistor 68 days ago [-]
There's many ways to do it: JMP (absolute or relative), NOP if fall-through is acceptance, or less favorably: invert the JMPcc such that invalid input becomes valid.
If I were a paranoid DOS-compatible publisher of expensive software, I would add layers of checks:
- checksum the entire executable on disk, at different points
- checksum the entire program resident in memory, at different points
- use a serial number and activation verification system based on public key cryptography and hardware attributes, and spread those checks around critical functionality. Store the activation code in the end of the root directory as phantom deleted file entries.
Ultimately though, does the increase in hassles and decrease in goodwill create more sales than it pushes away? I'd argue that intentionally no-DRM/no-cp software (GOG style) encourages brand goodwill and loyalty and there's even a nonzero conversion funnel from warez to paying customers. Cp is, thus, mostly an exercise in the practice of footgunnery by performative restrictions that do not deter technically-inclined persons. But like a sign that says "restroom for customers only", it doesn't add positive value. If they had instead spent more engineering time on the software and making the software priced for normal humans, they would have had more customers and more profits.
gruez 69 days ago [-]
>So you had to add code to detect modifications which itself could be bypassed.
Right, which is why DRM schemes aren't typically implemented in a straightforward way. Instead license checks are added to critical program logic so you can't easily skip it, anti-tamper/debug is added to thwart runtime analysis, and on top of all of this the code is obfuscated to thwart analysis even further. You might be eventually be able to figure it out, but it's designed to make it enough of a slog that nobody bothers to work through it all.
Rendered at 11:05:44 GMT+0000 (UTC) with Wasmer Edge.
[0] https://martypc.blogspot.com/2024/09/pc-floppy-copy-protecti...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootk... for a much newer example, albeit non-destructive. I vaguely remember some much more recent destructive examples, not sure if implemented or threatened, but I might be confusing things.
Edit: Found the incident I was thinking about using Gemini. A flight sim addon company FSLabs shipped malware with their installer. It didn't wipe data, it stole your Chrome password manager instead. https://www.reddit.com/r/flightsim/comments/xa58qz/a_retrosp... is a reddit summary, https://forums.flightsimlabs.com/index.php?%2Fannouncement%2... the company explaining/justifying what they did and why (TL;DR it was meant to be a targeted attack against some specific pirates).
The backlash to this measure was massive, as many legitimate products turned out to use counterfeit FTDI parts without the manufacturers' awareness due to unreliable supply chains. Microsoft quickly pulled the update but FTDI seemed not to care for the most part, eventually releasing another similar update a couple of years later that would deliberately corrupt all data sent through clone chips.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FTDI#Driver_controversy
[2]: https://github.com/therealdreg/ftdibrick#diving-deep
it could pretty much copy anything
copying disks in 1980s was like radar vs radar-detector battle, always escalating
https://www.robcraig.com/wiki/copy2pc-option-board-status/
It was a pretty healthy business, not just for the copy protection breaking but also the general tools software.
Funny story:
I was at their offices working on a project when they were getting ready to ship out the new version. Their warehouse was connected to the office building and they were producing all of the final copies and loading them on trucks to get sent to the distributors.
In the morning they gave the all clear for the first wave of trucks to leave, then about 4 hours later someone found a bug and they had to call all of the trucks back to the warehouse, unload, re-create new clean product etc.
They did this about 3 times before that version finally made it to the distributors.
So you had to add code to detect modifications which itself could be bypassed.
If I were a paranoid DOS-compatible publisher of expensive software, I would add layers of checks:
- checksum the entire executable on disk, at different points
- checksum the entire program resident in memory, at different points
- use a serial number and activation verification system based on public key cryptography and hardware attributes, and spread those checks around critical functionality. Store the activation code in the end of the root directory as phantom deleted file entries.
Ultimately though, does the increase in hassles and decrease in goodwill create more sales than it pushes away? I'd argue that intentionally no-DRM/no-cp software (GOG style) encourages brand goodwill and loyalty and there's even a nonzero conversion funnel from warez to paying customers. Cp is, thus, mostly an exercise in the practice of footgunnery by performative restrictions that do not deter technically-inclined persons. But like a sign that says "restroom for customers only", it doesn't add positive value. If they had instead spent more engineering time on the software and making the software priced for normal humans, they would have had more customers and more profits.
Right, which is why DRM schemes aren't typically implemented in a straightforward way. Instead license checks are added to critical program logic so you can't easily skip it, anti-tamper/debug is added to thwart runtime analysis, and on top of all of this the code is obfuscated to thwart analysis even further. You might be eventually be able to figure it out, but it's designed to make it enough of a slog that nobody bothers to work through it all.